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Since the 1960s the use of race has played a crucial role in American Presidential
elections; however, the way that it has been used has greatly evolved from 1960 to 2016. Central
to the discussion of racial politics is how coded language is used to talk about race, particularly
by conservatives.1 Nonetheless, coded language has not always been the norm. Starting with the
civil rights movement of the 1960s most race baiting rhetoric has moved into the realm of
implicit coded language. Much of this changed in 2015 when businessman Donald Trump made
the announcement that he was running for President. Suddenly it was as if the code meant less, it
did not go away, but Trump and his supporters found it less necessary to use it.2 What makes the
conversation about race so delicate and chaotic is that Trump did not completely break with
coded language; instead utilizing a combination of coded and un-coded language. What is
undeniable is that Trump’s powerful blend of coded and un-coded language drew an enormous
national following.3 How did this happen? What caused coded language to change so much that
Trump was able to employ rhetoric that had seemingly died in the 1950s and 1960s? This paper
will explore two intermediate theses that lead to a third, and ultimate thesis. First, this paper will
demonstrate the necessity of an evolution of the language used for successful race baiting. As
times have changed coded language has had to evolve alongside it in order to incite the greatest
following from backlash voters. This accompanies the paper’s second thesis; that there must be
social turmoil and anxiety amongst populations most susceptible to being racially baited. When
people are afraid for their social position they are much more susceptible to being racially baited.
Both of these theses help generate the ultimate thesis; that Trump took years of old coded

1

This is not to say there is no race baiting used by liberal politicians; race baiting in generally used more frequently
by conservatives than liberals.
2
This paper will focus on the use of code by Presidential candidates, not the use of such language by their
supporters. While the language of supporters is a fascinating subject, especially in the context of the 2016 election,
this paper lacks the time and space for such an exploration.
3
Trump’s announcement and campaign as a whole drew significant backlash resulting from his overt racial appeals
while simultaneously drawing an equally sizeable following.
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practices, broke many of them, and played to white backlash voter’s racial feelings and fears of
outsiders, particularly Muslims and Latinos. The question of Trump’s ascent to political
prominence, ultimately culminating in his election, has been, and will likely continue to be, the
topic of much scholarly debate. Accordingly, this paper by no means claims to give a definitive
answer for Trump’s success, but instead attempts to provide an explanation for part of what
made Trump’s rhetoric so powerful, as well as how it fits into a larger history of coded language
in American political rhetoric.4
This research will be carried out through an examination of a variety of campaign
messaging platforms, including: campaign ads, speeches, social media, and other major forms of
political communication.5 To understand the power of coded language it is necessary to find the
language that reaches the largest group of people; consequently the platform for the exploration
of coded language will change depending on the election in question. As a result there is a
greater focus on social media in 2016 as opposed to 1968, 1988 and 2008 since social media was
the dominant campaign messaging tool of 2016. In order to understand the power of Trump’s
rhetoric one must understand the use of rhetoric in the past; since only an understanding of the
past allows an understanding of the present. Therefore this paper will examine three historic
elections in order to trace the history of racially coded rhetoric and its influence on the 2016
election.

4

The author would like to emphasize that he is by no means making the claim that he believes all Trump supporters
are backlash, and racially motivated voters. He is seeking to illustrate how race baiting and more specifically racial
code was successfully implemented in the Presidential campaign of Donald Trump.
5
While this work will attempt to examine as much campaign rhetoric as possible it is nearly impossible to look at
and discuss all campaign messaging. As a result this paper does not claim to be 100% comprehensive, but will look
to cover as much ground as possible in order to provide as clear a picture of coded language as possible.
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The first election used will be 1968; where Republican Richard Nixon defeated
Democrat Hubert Humphrey and Independent George Wallace. This election featured the
beginning of “law and order” rhetoric and the birth of the “southern strategy”; two major aspects
of coded language that became a central part of American politics. This election also provides a
prime example of different methods and shades of race baiting. Both Nixon and Wallace racially
baited voters, but because of their previous stances on racial issues did so in different ways. The
next election studied is the 1988 election where George H.W. Bush defeated Michael Dukakis.
Notably for the history of coded language 1988 provided one of modern history’s most powerful
examples of coded language, featuring the Willie Horton ad which has had a lasting impact on
American political rhetoric around race. 2008 supposedly marked a turning point for elections,
and for American race relations as a whole. Theoretically ushering America into a new “postracial era” when Barack Obama defeated John McCain for the Presidency. During this election
the presence of Barack Obama, a black man, at the top of a Presidential ticket opened the door
for a new and slightly altered form of code; one that used a presidential candidate as a target for
coded language and race baiting as a whole. The final election is the one that drives the research;
the 2016 election, where Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton. This election featured a
mixture of coded and un-coded language, but with un-coded language making a monumental
comeback into the mainstream vernacular. The coded language of 2016 was about more than just
blacks and whites, greatly expanding to an intense focus on Muslims, Latinos and other
immigrant groups.6

6

Unfortunately due to time and page restraints this paper cannot explore the use of code around gender in the 2016
election; something that many have pointed to as being a key factor in Hillary Clinton’s defeat.
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The discussion of race and consequently coded language about race is a very delicate and
controversial subject in American political rhetoric. As a result the discussion of such a topic is
likely to disconcert people, therefore in order to help reduce such anxiety it is necessary to
provide a thorough background of the historiography of coded language.7 Therefore prior to
entering an examination of coded langue in 1968, 1988, 2008, and the evolution of coded
language that resulted in the 2016 election this paper begins by providing a historiography of the
history and necessity of coded language.
Historiography
The 2016 election featured the explosion of Donald Trump onto the political stage, and
with it the return of an unfiltered, un-coded, discussion of race in the American political
vernacular. The day Trump said that Mexicans coming into the United States were “bringing
drugs… bringing crime… they’re rapists,” the code around race changed, as certain aspects of
code became less prevalent in the racial politics vernacular. 8 Trump successfully appealed to
backlash whites’ fears of non-white groups.9 In doing so he treaded on the implicit nature of
these appeals, something that had been previously understood to be necessary.10 However,

7

A note from the author. The nature of this topic is likely to upset some groups of people, or raise the argument that
what is described in this paper is untrue. If, as a reader, this topic causes you discomfort or anger and prompts you to
disagree with the work presented here I welcome this sort of disagreement as the creation of dialogue is part of the
nature of democracy and progress. I provide this note as a caution of what is to come and what to expect, and as a
message about the goal of this work.
8
Donald Trump, “Presidential Campaign Announcement” (speech, New York City, NY, June 16, 2015), CBS
News, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-donald-trump-announces-his-presidential-candidacy/.
9
Ted Brader, Elizabeth Suhay and Nicholas A. Valentino, “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration?
Anxiety, Groups Cues, and Immigration Threat,” Midwest Political Science Association (52), No. 4 (2008): 959-60.
In this paper Brader, Suhay and Valentino provide a study of how politicians are able to spur animosity towards
immigrant groups, particularly and with much greater success, towards non-white groups.
10
Vincent L. Hutchings, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Ismail K. White. “Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime
Racial Attitudes During Campaigns,” American Political Science Review (96), No. 1 (2002): 76, 88. Also see John
Hurwitz and Marc Peffley, “Playing the Race Card in the Post-Willie Horton Era: The Impact of Racialized Code
Words on Support for Punitive Crime Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly (69), No. 1 (2005): 101. For an indepth
look at the necessity of implicit language see: Tali Mendelberg. “Executing Hortons: Racial Crime in the 1988
Presidential Campaigns,” The Public Opinion Quarterly (61), No. 1 (1997): 137-38, 152.
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historical events do not occur in a vacuum, and neither did Trump’s movement, as racial politics
have been an evolving issue since 1960.11 Therefore to understand Trump’s code altering ability
one must first examine the historiography of coded language’s history, circumstances that make
this sort of language effective, and Trump’s language itself.
The 1960s brought the Civil Rights movement, and with it a change in the way that race
was discussed. The use of coded racial language essentially began with the “southern strategy,” a
way for conservatives like Richard Nixon to talk about race; but in a way that disguised race as a
neutral point about busing, affirmative action, or a similar race neutral topic.12 In the “The Fog of
War”, Gerard Alexander illustrates the “southern strategy’s” appeal to white voters through
“items with explicit racial connotations…but was otherwise ostensibly race-neutral.”13
Alexander’s work provides an overview of the origins of coded language and how the “southern
strategy” was essential in creating the conservative “base”. Alexander points to race as only one
part of the conservative story; in contrast, Jeremy Mayer’s Running on Race puts race at the very
center of the American electoral story. Mayer argues that “perhaps no other issue shows the
limitations of economic analysis better than racial politics does.”14 A thesis he illuminates by
providing in-depth analysis of race’s role in 20th century presidential elections. Mayer’s book is
exceptional in its ability to tell the stories of race in individual elections. In the chapter about the
1968 election Mayer uses the Nixon campaign’s speeches and correspondence, found in
newspaper articles and archives, to tell the story of Nixon’s coded rhetoric and the “southern

11

Jeremy Mayer, Running on Race (New York: Random House, 2002), 3. In this work Mayer provides an overview
and in-depth analysis of race’s role in every U.S. Presidential election from 1960-2000.
12
Gerard Alexander, “The Fog of Political War: Predicting the Future Course of Conservatism,” The Journal of
Political History (26), No. 1 (2014): 122-123.
13
Ibid, 122.
14
Jeremy Mayer, Running on Race (New York: Random House, 2002), 8.
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strategy” as a whole.15 The 1968 election also provides an excellent case study about the
effectiveness of different layers of coded language.16 Elsewhere Mayer argues that what made
Nixon’s message so salient was that it said close to the same thing as George Wallace’s, but did
so using a more nuanced code, consequently it did not turn away as voters who feared being seen
as racist.17 1968 made coded language a key political tactic, but is was 1988 that made in central
for the American people.
The 1988 election featured the “Willie Horton” ad; which used fear to become one of the
most effective coded appeals in history. Using an experiment where some people saw videos of
the Horton ad, and some saw neutral ads, Tali Mendelberg showed the power of coded language
that associated Horton with racial fears.18 Mendelberg argues that the Horton ad was a textbook
“southern strategy” style race baiting maneuver; the ad talked about a theoretically non-racial
issue (crime) while playing on backlash white fears of blacks.19 Additionally the Horton ad
offered ample opportunity for plausible deniability to claim it was not racial, something essential
to racial appeals.20 Several campaign ads linked negative feelings of blacks and crime, and
sought to demonstrate that Bush, not Dukakis was the candidate to stop crime.21 What both
Mendelberg and Mayer show is that the Horton ad’s effectiveness lay in its ability to connect
blacks, through Horton, to crime without ever mentioning race. The importance of the Horton ad

“The Bullets, the Ballots, and the Backlash: The Charged Racial Politics of 1968,” chapter in Running on Race.
Jeremy Mayer, “Nixon Rides the Backlash to Victory: Racial Politics in the 1968 Campaign,” Historian (64), No.
1 (1997): 359, 363.
17
Ibid.
18
Tali Mendelberg, “Executing Hortons: Racial Crime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign, The Public Opinion
Quarterly (61), No. 1 (1997):150.
19
Ibid. 151.
20
Jessica Autumn Brown, “Running on Fear: Immigration, Race and Crime Framings in Contemporary Debate
Discourse,” Critical Criminology (24), (2016): 317. Brown offers an excellent definition of coded language. Saying
“techniques which denigrate minority populations but do so obliquely enough to allow the speaker room for
deniability if challenged”.
21
Mayer, Running on Race, 220-221.
15
16
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in 1988 cannot be overstated, as its legacy has played a role in any politician’s decision to “play
the race card”. The Horton ad forever linked race and crime; which made it very easy for modern
politicians to slip coded words about crime into political discourse, since the Horton ad had
already created an association between the two.22
The Horton ad created strong political links between blacks and crime which have existed
since; by 2008 the code had expanded, despite some calling it the beginning of a “post-racial
era.”23 Obama’s presence in the election led some on both sides of the aisle to say racism was
waning; this had a side-effect of making racial issues, and especially the use of code, powerful
conservative ammunition.24 John McCain’s 2008 campaign ads often portrayed Obama as being
“uppity, a term suggesting Blacks are out of their place of subordination,” or as “not ready to
lead… (which) tied Obama to stereotypes of African American inaptitude.”25 The goal of these
ads, as Camille Charles and Maryann Erigha argued was to associate Obama with older codes
and stereotypes of blacks being incompetent. A similar argument is made when Anthony Sparks
demonstrates how discussion about Obama had parallels with minstrel shows of the Jim Crow
era. Sparks demonstrates this when describing the McCain campaign’s and media’s descriptions
of Obama as a “Black man who speak(s) too well… the McCain campaign drew on a historic and
national ambivalence toward the educated and public Black (male) body.”26 The 2008 election

Jon Hurwitz and Marc Peffley, “Playing the Race Card in the Post-Willie Horton Era: The Impact of Racialized
Code Words on Support for Punitive Crime Policy,” Ethnic and Racial Studies (27), No. 5 (2006): 100. Hurwitz and
Peffley illustrate the power of racial appeals in an experiment using the buzzword “inner-city” and its effect on
priming conservative feelings and the results showed a strong linkage.
23
Thomas Edge, “Southern Strategy 2.0: Conservatives, White Voters and the Election of Barack Obama,” Journal
of Black Studies (40), No. 3 (2010): 427. Camille Z. Charles and Maryann Erigha, “Other Uppity Obama: A Content
Analysis of Race Appeals in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,” Du Bois Review (9), No. 2 (2012): 438. Anthony
Sparks, “Minstrel Politics or “He Speaks too Well:” Rhetoric, Race, and Resistance in the 2008 Presidential
Campaign,” Argumentation and Advocacy (46), 2009: 23. Autumn Brown, “Running on Fear: Immigration, Race,
and Crime Framings in Contemporary GOP Presidential Debate Discourse,” 329.
24
Edge, 435, 438.
25
Charles and Erigha 448-49.
26
Sparks, 31.
22
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demonstrates how conservatives used similar coding practices from 1968 and 1988 about blacks
and crime and applied them to Obama, making him a coded surrogate for all blacks.27 Since 2008
there has been an expansion of coded language from being mainly about blacks to including
other groups, especially Latinos and Muslims.28 Jessica Autumn Brown makes this argument by
showing how race baiting about these groups is increasingly frequent in present GOP discourse;
this is a product of a shift in backlash whites’ fears, and is the next aspect of this
historiography.29
The history of the code is vital to understanding the next part of the coded language
historiography, which explores the circumstances and types of links necessary to make coded
language most effective. Coded appeals are most effective during times of social upheaval, or
when backlash whites are in a position they fear they are losing the status they once had.30
Matthew Hughey demonstrates this argument through a discussion of 3 crucial times in
American history: the 1960s, the 1980s and post 2000.31 Simple circumstance is not enough for
coded language to resonate with voters; these appeals must also possess some form of either one
or both of the following characteristics. The first is they must resonate with either a fear or

Vincent L. Hutchings and Nicholas A. Valentino, “The Centrality of Race in American Politics,” American
Political Science Review (96), (2002): 394. While this article precedes Obama’s election by 6 years Hutchings and
Valentino describe how “some racial cues evoke historic racial stereotypes… trigger more psychologically oriented
racial reactions.” Similar instances occurred in the attempts to use coded language to associate Obama with racial
stereotypes
28
Brown, “Running on Fear: Immigration, Race, and Crime Framings in Contemporary GOP Presidential Debate
Discourse,” 329. Jessica Autumn Brown, “The New “Southern Strategy:” Immigration, Race, and “Welfare
Dependency” in Contemporary U.S. Republican Debate Discourse,” Critical Ciminology (24), (2016): 34, 37.
Space constraints limit the ability to specifically discuss links between Obama and terrorism as code. The expansion
of this form of code is well explained by Anthony Sparks (34) when he argues the code linking Obama to terrorism
attacks him as both inadequate and unprepared for office, as well as linking Obama, Islam and terrorism together.
29
Brown, “Running on Fear: Immigration, Race, and Crime Framings in Contemporary GOP Presidential Debate
Discourse,” 329. Brown, “The New “Southern Strategy:” Immigration, Race, and “Welfare Dependency” in
Contemporary U.S. Republican Debate Discourse,” 37-38.
30
Matthew W. Hughey, “White Backlash in the ‘Post-Racial’ United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies (37), No.5
(2014): 722.
31
Ibid. 722-723.
27
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anxiety towards a minority group.32 The other major factor is that the appeal must create a
connection between a minority group and conservative views, usually about small government or
limited spending.33
When it comes to code towards a minority group it is typically much more effective for
that appeal to be made when there is anger towards that group; something illustrated in the
argument made by Antoine Banks and Nicholas Valentino.34 This is demonstrated in a
sociological experiment designed to see what sort of emotions individuals have towards policies
designed to help blacks. Through this experiment they found that the most common feelings
elicited were those of fear or anger. Banks and Valentino found that the higher a person’s racial
resentment was, the angrier they felt towards policies geared to help blacks. From this they argue
that someone with high levels of racial resentment is likely to be quick to anger at the association
of policies aimed to help these groups, a concept very evident with groups such as the Tea Party.
This idea is strengthened by Ted Brader et. al, who, in a 2008 experiment designed to look at
opinions regarding immigration, found that there is higher anti-immigrant sentiment when the
immigrants in question are Latino rather than when they are European. This idea becomes
especially powerful when the less favored immigrant group is discussed alongside negative
stereotypes about that group, and pre-existing anxiety towards that group can be emphasized

Antoine J. Banks and Nicholas A. Valentino, “Emotional Substrates of White Racial Attitudes,” Midwest Political
Science Association (56), No. 2 (2012): 288-289. Ted Brader, Elizabeth Suhay and Nicholas A. Valentino. 959, 97576. Paul A. Passavant, “Political Subjectivity and Presidential Campaign Ads,” Political Science and Politics (49),
No. 1 (2016): 38. Melania A. Buckner and Michael W. Giles, “David Duke and Black Threat: An Old Hypothesis
Revisited,” Journal of Politics (55), No. 3 (1993): 708, 710-71.
33
Martin Gilens, “ “Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare,” The American Political Science Review (90),
No. 3 (1996): 593-94, 598. P.J. Henry and David Sears, “The Origins of Symbolic Racism,” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology (85), No. 37 (2015): 263-64, 272. David O. Sears and Nicholas A. Valentino, “Old Times
there are not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South,” American Journal of Political
Science (49), No.3 (2005): 280-81. Hutchings, Valentino and White, 82, 84. L.J. Zigerell, “Distinguishing Racism
from Ideology: A Methodological Inquiry,” Political Research Quarterly (68), No. 3. (2015): 522.
34
Banks and Valentino. 294.
32
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through implicit messaging.35 In addition to feelings of fear or anxiety towards immigrants, the
presence of large minority groups in an area can also spark backlash fears. This is shown by
Melanie Buckner and Michael Giles, whose study illuminated the increase in white voter
registration in counties with a substantial black population when a candidate brought out fears of
minority groups.36 This sort of anxiety stirring can best be seen at the national level in 1968,
when Nixon deftly used the “southern strategy” and emphasized the turmoil caused by rioting in
the wake of the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy.37 What makes the
use of fear and anxiety appeals especially useful is that they tie in pre-existing white fears
towards minorities and use them to create animus towards policies designed in the favor of these
minority groups.
The other crucial link to be built for these coded appeals to work is through association of
anti-minority feelings and traditional conservative polices.38 Martin Gilens illuminates how there
is a higher feeling of antipathy towards social welfare policies when the policies are viewed as
“favoring minorities”; for example “means tested public-assistance” such as welfare receives
much higher hostility than policies such as Medicaid because the former is predominantly
associated with blacks.39 This negative association is shown to be much stronger in the form of
symbolic racism, which results from a combination of racial prejudice and conservative values;
this becomes especially effective at creating a feeling that blacks already get more than they
deserve so the government does not need to help them anymore.40 This mixing of conservative

35

Brader, Suhay, and Valentino. 963, 975.
Buckner and Giles. 708. Buckner and Giles use David Duke’s Lousiana Senate run as a case study for their article.
37
Passavant. 38. Mayer “Nixon Rides the Backlash to Victory”. 354.
38
L.J. Zigerell warns of accidently mixing up anti-black sentiment with general conservative policies of small
government and individualism. See his work “Distinguishing Racism from Ideology” for an explanation of the
dangers of confusing symbolic racism (anti-black or anti-minority feelings) with general conservatism.
39
Gilens. 593-94.
40
Henry and Sears. 264. This study dealt specifically with anti-black feeling and conservative leaning.
36
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feelings and racial animus can become especially influential in areas that are high in both
feelings; for example these feeling tend to both be more prevalent in the “Old Confederacy.”41 In
general, it is crucial that coded language remains implicit in order to provide plausible
deniability; several works illustrate that when racial appeals become explicit they become less
effective.42 This occurs because it is seen as a norm violation, or because overt appeals convey
explicit racism which turns people away from these policies.43
The final historiographical step is to examine what makes Trump’s language so appealing
to so many people. As many of the aforementioned authors have argued racial appeals work best
in times of uncertainty, or when people fear the “other”; and this is an appeal that Trump
provides. As Patrick Fisher demonstrates Trump did best in the primaries in states where there
were a lot of “left behind whites,” or in states where people who had less positive views of
government; what Fisher effectively shows is that Trump perfectly played upon racial fears and
uncertain times. 44 Thomas Edsall of the New York Times adds to this argument quoting David
Berg of the Yale School of Medicine saying “for many voters, perceived threats to their security
are now coming.”45 When people are afraid of an outside threat, especially from foreigners
taking their power and status, they are more drawn to racial appeals, similar to Trump’s. One of
Trump’s most common talking points during, and even since the election, is that “the election is
rigged against him,” an appeal Yoni Appelbaum of The Atlantic labels as very dangerous, and

Sears and Valentino. 285. The “Old Confederacy” consists of the 11 states that seceded during the civil war.
Gregory A. Huber and John S. Lapinski, “The “Race Card” Revisited: Assessing Racial Priming in Policy
Contests,” American Journal of Political Science (50), No. 2 (2006):428. Hutchings, Valentino, and White. 75-76.
43
Huber and Lapinski. 438.
44
Patrick I. Fisher, “Definitely not Moralistic: State Political Culture and Support for Donald Trump in the Race for
the 2016 Republican Presidential Nomination,” The American Political Science Association, (2016): 743, 745. A
similar situation to the one described by Fisher would be in 1968, when Nixon played upon the uncertainty of those
times.
45
Thomas B. Edsall, “Donald Trump’s Appeal,” New York Times (New York, NY), Dec. 2, 2015).
41
42
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suggests may be a racist and sexist code. Appelbaum discusses how the claim alludes to minority
groups and women, demographics where Trump’s appeals were weaker. Thus, Appelbaum
argues, that when Trump says the election is illegitimate, he may be suggesting that these
people’s vote are illegitimate.46 This idea relates to much of the previous literature about how
racial backlash is at its most powerful when whites fear loss of power and influence; something
that is an increasing concern for many whites today. Part of what makes Trump’s racial rhetoric
so appealing can be effectively summed up in the quote of one Trump supporter “I feel he’s the
last chance we have to establish law and order and preserve the culture I grew up in.”47 As
Michelle Cottle argues, Trump has been able to ignore the code and explicitly appeal to people’s
racial fears because people are so angry and fearful about change and being left behind. Trump’s
explicit appeals become acceptable to his base because he effectively speaks to their anxiety in
uncertain times.
The historiography around coded language has led to a point where Trump has seen a
situation where circumstances are ripe for racially resentful appeals; and the anger of the people
has enabled him to be more explicit with some appeals than most politicians have been in recent
memory. This literature now prepares us to examine coded appeals in the past, and how they
have evolved to the point where Trump has successfully used many of them in an explicit
manner. The task now is to explain what has been so difficult for many to comprehend; what
made Trump so politically successful?

Yoni Appelbaum. “Trump’s Rigged Game,” The Atlantic, October 16. 2016.
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/trumps-rigged-game/504299/?utm_source=atlfb.
47
Michelle Cottle, “Trump Fans have more to lose than Trump Himself,” the Atlantic, October 14, 2016.
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/what-will-happen-to-the-trump-diehards/504032/?utm_source=atlfb
46

Bruno 13

Coded Language: The History and Message
The first major undertaking in understanding our ultimate thesis is to examine the history
of coded language in American Presidential rhetoric. In order to understand the code one must
look at what exactly is being said; what words and imagery are being used to appeal to the
“backlash electorate.” Crucial to this is understanding the links between what is being said or
illustrated and the sort of reaction that it can conjure up from backlash voters.48 In the case of
each specific election it becomes necessary to examine what makes these “loaded” words loaded;
this is best done by going right into the sources and looking at what has been said, as well
looking at the social and political circumstances of the time, something that is necessary in order
to understand the concerns of people in specific time periods. Thus in order to achieve the most
thorough understanding of the coded language used in each election theses one and two are
examined in tandem; understanding the code cannot be done without understanding the time
period and vice versa. For example, in order to get the best understanding of coded language in
1968 it is necessary to identify a phrase such as “law and order” while simultaneously seeing
how this phrase became charged during the turbulent 1960s that preceded its use. Our study
begins in 1968 looking at the new “southern strategy”; however this is not treated as a single
election on its own, but as a watershed moment in the history of racially coded language.
The 1968 election came during a turbulent time for the United States; the country was
bogged down in the Vietnam War, while closer to home there was violence, which seemingly
consumed urban America every summer between 1965 and 1967.49 The social upheaval of the
time made Nixon’s emphasis on “law and order” especially salient for a population where 81%

48
49

Banks and Valentino, 287-88. Gilens, 598.
Mayer, Running on Race, 71.
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of people “agreed that law and order had broken down.”50 This anxiety about a lack of order
featured strongly in Nixon’s rhetoric; both in his campaign ads and in his acceptance speech.
Nixon began the campaign emphasizing law and order, and by appealing to people’s fears of
blacks and social unrest.51 This was demonstrated in his acceptance speech of the Republican
Presidential nomination where he said “As we look at America, we see cities enveloped in smoke
and flame. We hear sirens in the night.”52 Crucially for the code he never says anything about
blacks or race. To people sitting in the audience, or watching at home, who were very concerned
about racial tensions, especially the 54% of people who “said fear of racial violence made them
uneasy on the streets”53 Nixon’s statement would have sent them a clear message- a message
stressing that Nixon knew who and what they were afraid of, and one that emphasized that he
was going to make sure that white people felt safe. Nixon’s acceptance speech at the Republican
National Convention demonstrates that he knew that racial coding needed to remain implicit.54
This was most evident when, in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention he
said “And to those who say that law and order is the code word for racism, there and here is a
reply: Our goal is justice for every American. If we are to have respect for law in American, we
must have laws that deserve respect.”55 It is clear that Nixon understood the implicit meanings of
his statements; he understood the racial tensions and unease white Americans had in the wake of

Ben Schott, “The Way we Were, 1968” New York Times, August 1, 2008. Schott is citing a Gallup poll from 1968
conducted by Louis Harris.
51
Mayer, Running on Race, 83. While having previously been a moderate on Civil Rights and a member of the
NAACP Nixon became part of the Republican move towards the right on race.
52
Richard Nixon. “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Miami
Beach, Florida.” (Speech, Miami Beach, FL, August 8, 1968) The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25968.
53
Schott, citing Gallup in 1968
54
The importance of the implicit nature of coded language is well documented by Huber and Lapinski (421-422)
who said “If a message’s racial content is too apparent, the norm of equality becomes active. If it is absent, then the
message will not activate anti-black predispositions at all.”
55
Richard Nixon, 1968.
50
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the Civil Rights movement and the rioting and violence that had followed and so he said to them,
with a bit of a wink, that he would ensure “law and order”.56 What Nixon said was that he would
be keeping safety; while what was understood was that would help protect whites in their
traditional places of power. This message would set the tone not only for his campaign but also
for future coded campaigns, since staying coded is absolutely crucial for sending a racially baited
message, but making sure one never gets accused of being racist.
Nixon expends a lot of effort in his campaign ads to use coded language, as well as
powerful imagery and music to appeal to backlash voters. The ad “The First Civil Right” starts
out very dark and frightening; with shrill, horror movie sounding music played over the top of
images of screaming protesters and burning buildings.57 During the first 30 seconds of the ad
there is no talking, just this imagery; during this time the viewer is left to fill in the gaps of who
or what caused this violence and destruction. This is crucial in building implicit links between
blacks, violence and crime; nothing is ever said about race, but the ad leaves it open to the
viewer’s interpretation about who caused this violence and destruction. 58 The narrator finally
enters halfway through the ad making one of his few comments “let us recognize that the first
civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence”; this comment is crucial for
both the code and Nixon’s intended message.59 Not only has code about blacks and violence
been built, but there is now another code that is pushing the Civil Rights movement down as less
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important by making the obvious statement that safety is everyone’s civil right. This is
comparable to the contemporary “All Lives Matter” concept that emerged to push back against
“Black Lives Matter”. Both “the first civil right” and “All Lives Matter” seek to downplay the
importance of civil rights or stopping violence against blacks by making the universally accepted
statement that all people have a right to life and safety, consequently minimizing the more
immediate problems facing these minority communities. Additionally closing the monologue
with the call to order goes back to Nixon’s main theme of “law and order”, which is central to
the code around blacks as criminals, while also maintaining whites in a position of power. This
ad would have been lacking in its ability to draw people in if it was not created at a time when
17% of people said civil rights were the most important problem facing the country, and another
12% said “racial strife” was the biggest concern facing the country.60 The timing was key, since
this ad campaign came out when the minority group facing the most racial animosity was blacks;
thus the Nixon campaign’s consistent use of advertising that connected blacks and crime was
very effective at priming racial animosities and getting out the backlash vote.61
Similarly to the “First Civil Rights”, the ad “Crime" plays directly to the code of blacks
and crime, subtly using backlash against the civil rights movement and accompanying anxiety as
a deep and powerful code. 62 On the surface there is the code linking blacks and crime;
recognizing this code is much easier because “law and order” became a pretty much catch-all
phrase for Nixon’s racial coding.63 However, there is also a different level of more nuanced
code; this occurs when the narrator says there will be protection for the decent people of the
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country and “the wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the future in America.”64 This is a
coded way of saying that despite the civil rights movement and the new found power and
equality that black have, the Nixon administration is going to make sure that minority groups do
not come in to too much power. There is again no mention of race in this discussion of crime
which is central in keeping the code going while maintaining plausible deniability.65 The ad had
to make clear that the new found upward mobility for blacks was negative for whites, while
simultaneously not breaking any code, which would have severely damaged the ads
effectiveness.
Unique to this election was that it featured another candidate known for racing baiting,
George Wallace; who was much less nuanced about race baiting than Nixon was. Part of
understanding Wallace’s ability to race bait is understanding his history of not being coded.
Wallace was traditionally known as an ardent supporter of “states’ rights” and segregation.
Consequently when he “tried to hide behind states’ rights saying that he only advocated
segregation as best for Alabama”66 the code was easier to recognize as race baiting. The voters
Wallace searched for were most likely voters possessing higher levels of racial resentment,
accordingly it would take less race baiting for them to draw parallels between the message and
what it symbolized.67 This is very evident in Wallace’s ad “busing/law and order”; using two
racially loaded phrases insinuate that the ad will be loaded with racially coded language and
appeals.68 The ad is representative of the campaign Wallace ran; there were hints of code, but it
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was consistently very shallow code. At one point in this ad there is an image of a pair of what
appear to be white women’s legs in high heels walking down a dark street, the image is
succeeded by a nearby light being shot out, while a voice says “why are more and more millions
of Americans turning to Governor Wallace? Take a walk in your street tonight.”69 There is a
clear attempt here to tie fears of crime with the age old fears of black men preying on white
women.70 The Wallace campaign understood these fears and racist stereotypes; accordingly they
used a shallow code to arouse backlash whites into voting for Wallace. “Law and order/ busing”
is an excellent representation of Wallace’s attempts to race bait as much as he could while hiding
behind the shallowest of codes.
The 1968 presidential campaign provides a tremendous springboard from which to begin
a study of the power of coded language. Not only was it the first election where coded language
was a necessity when it came to race baiting, but it also provides a prime example of how code
can be nuanced to achieve different goals. Nixon’s much more nuanced code showed that he was
trying to hid the fact that he was race baiting, whereas Wallace’s campaign likely aimed at those
with high levels of racial resentment and therefore needed to use a less subtle form of code.
The 1988 election featured one of the most blatant and powerful examples of coded
language; featuring the “Willie Horton” ad, a thinly veiled attempt to make race baiting look like
a discussion of crime. While 1988 was unique from 1968, it contained many elements that
showed how it built upon the 1968 campaign. The 1980s were the Reagan years, a time of strong
individualism and conservative backlash against the social liberal policies of the 1960s; this was
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also the era where welfare became a powerful code word to talk about blacks.71 Bush’s goal in
this election was to paint himself as a continuation of all of the good that come out of small
government and individualism of the Raegan era. As the times changed, so did the coded phrases
used for race baiting; consequently there was a shift in the vernacular from loading phrases such
bussing and the “threat” posed by the civil rights movement to loading phrases such as welfare
and drugs.72 A crucial theme continued from 1968 to 1988 was the necessity of crime framings
as a key racial code. In 1968 Nixon used “law and order” as the center piece of his campaign,
while in 1988 Willie Horton would become the centerpiece of the crime code and the election
itself.73
The enduring memory of the 1988 election would be the Willie Horton ad, a deftly
calculated political move that impeccably brought crime and race together, and into the forefront
of the American voters’ mind. The campaign picked up on the Horton story in early May, 1988,
and used Horton as a powerful race bait once the general election began.74 As Roger Ailes, a
media adviser in the Bush campaign, said “The only question is whether we depict Willie Horton
with a knife in his hand or without it.”75 This helps make clear that this ad was planned to be a
center piece of a campaign that would use racial code.76 Bush’s move to use code in the
campaign was evident from his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in
August. Interestingly his speech embraces a much more nuanced race bait than the more obvious
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use of race baiting in the campaign itself. In his acceptance speech Bush said “I’m the one who
believes it is a scandal to give a weekend furlough to a hardened, first-degree killer.”77 Central to
this appeal is that it linked traditional conservative beliefs, a support for stronger jail sentences,
with negative racial feelings about blacks; this maneuver is a central part of priming the racial
resentment used in coded language.78 Bush would again draw on the links between conservatism
and racial prejudice following up that appeal by saying “I’m the one who says a drug dealer who
is responsible for the death of a policemen should be subject to capital punishment.”79 This
demonstrates another attempt to link conservative feelings about capital punishment with race
since the Reagan era had done a great deal to racially code drugs and drug dealers. The
acceptance speech began linking race with traditional conservative principles, which helped pave
the way for the Horton ad.
The Willie Horton ad was groundbreaking when it came to racial coding in modern
American politics. The ad begins innocently enough, comparing the two men’s positions on
crime and the death penalty; once Horton’s name and accompanying mugshot appear the ad
becomes code for race and does so in a very thinly veiled way.80 The first instance of race baiting
through code is by referring to Horton as “Willie” instead of William; in calling him “Willie” the
ad creators attempt to make Horton seem like a racial character, in an attempt to dehumanize
him.81 The dehumanization of Horton was a clear attempt to try and strengthen the link between
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Horton’s race and white’s historic fears of black men. The power behind this ad is best described
by Roger Simon of the Baltimore Sun, who said “He was big. He was black. He was every guy
you ever crossed street to avoid… He was every person you moved out of the city to escape,
every sound in the night that made you… check the locks on the windows.”82 The mugshot,
coupled with the words “kidnapping”, “stabbing”, and “raping” appear beneath a picture of
Horton staring down at a Police Officer which is used to emphasize the message of fear. Race
could be completely left out, because the ad, which featured Horton’s mugshot and the picture of
Horton scowling at the Police Officer, was effective in conveying the message of fear which was
crucial in linking blacks and crime in a thinly coded way. This same message was stressed in the
“revolving door” ad that showed prisoners walking through a revolving prison door.83 Prisoners
of all different races are seen walking through a revolving door, but what is designed to stand out
is a black prisoner with an afro staring menacingly at the camera. This stare is designed to
provoke fear from the audience in a similar way that Horton’s menacing mugshot is designed to
in the “Willie Horton” ad. The ad makes the statement that there are criminals from all races, but
the real criminals, the ones voters should be afraid of are large black men, like Willie Horton.
These ads were clear examples of race baiting, but importantly for their effectiveness as
code was that they offered plausible deniability as a discussion about crime since Horton was a
multi-time felon. Despite the plausibility of it being about crime it was clear what the
campaign’s intended goals were; they had a powerful story of a black man attacking a white
couple, and raping a white women, and they were going to make the most of it to appeal to
backlash voters and discredit Dukakis. The fear and raw emotion that crimes elicits from people
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is powerful, which helped make the Horton ad so effective.84 The ad contained the major
components necessary for race baiting: crime, threat to whites and fear. The Horton ad forever
changed how racial coding could be used; in the ensuing years, whenever politicians tried to race
bait they had to make sure their ads would not become the next “Willie Horton” ad. More
powerfully though is that the Horton ad demonstrated how disastrous of an effect these fear
mongering ads could have on opponents of those who use them. These tactics would not
disappear after 1988, and they would find a new place to latch onto, the 2008 Democratic
Presidential candidate Barack Obama.
While 2008 was a unique election in many ways it also contained elements that carried
over from previous elections. The 2008 election came at a troubling time for the United States;
with the two major issues being the struggling economy and ongoing War in Iraq. The major
concern about these factors is indicated in a February 2008 Gallup poll where 89% of people
surveyed said the candidates position on the economy was “extremely/very important” and 87%
said the situation in Iraq was “extremely/very important”.85 On the surface it may have appeared
that these major issues would overshadow the use of racially based appeals; however a closer
look yields an indication about the power racial issues could, and would have. The same Gallup
poll showed that “Terrorism” was “extremely important” for 50% of Republicans while “Moral
values” were “extremely important” for 39% of Republican voters.86 While these issues are not
necessarily overtly racial they provide an opportunity to use code since the nature of these issues
show potential fears amongst the backlash electorate. In this election the McCain campaign, and
accompanying PACs, would use very nuanced code to try and tie Obama to older negative
84
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stereotypes about blacks. Similarly, although much less overtly, than the way that Horton was
used as a surrogate for blacks and crime, Obama became a code for talking about blacks as a
group, often using many coded terms that had become widely used in preceding elections.
Obama’s presence at the top of the ticket allowed McCain and the GOP to attack Obama, often
using old “dog-whistle” words and black stereotypes, doing so in a way that connected Obama
with negative perceptions of blacks. These appeals became some of the most subtle forms of
code seen to date.
The 2008 election began what some may have perceived to be the beginning of a postracial era in America; however as most people would quickly realize the candidacy and
eventually presidency of Barack Obama would lead to anything but a post-racial era.87 At this
point in the discussion of coded language it is necessary to momentarily pause and make note of
a potential critique of this research. Many phrases that could be considered coded appeals,
especially ones seen in the 2008 election, are phrases that may simply be meant as traditional
conservative language, with no “dog-whistles” attached to them. L.J. Zigerell provides an
important warning about the dangers of confusing coded language with traditional conservative
rhetoric, when in reality the language is merely a good faith non-racial appeal.88 This is an area
of inquiry where one must tread lightly; it is important to bring to light and discuss genuine
instances of race baiting, it is of equal importance to ensure that one is not painting all
conservative language with a broad brush, for doing so would undermine the fairness of any
potential discussion about race and politics. Consequently this paper has, and will continue to
only illuminate what appear to be genuine racially coded appeals. However as the author has
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previously acknowledged this is a contentious subject and there will undoubtedly be
disagreements about what is and was is not a racially coded appeal.
Noticeably the beginning of McCain’s campaign sent a message that this would be a civil
campaign; in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention McCain utilized
minimal coded racial appeals. One example that McCain may have been using coded language,
and intended to use it in the general campaign, was when he used a pair of traditional “dogwhistle” phrases in describing the campaign’s platform, saying “we believe in… personal
responsibility, rule of law…”89 This appeal is much closer to the traditional racially coded
appeals seen in 1968 and 1988. Accordingly by 2008 these “dog-whistle” words had become so
ingrained in the racial coding vernacular that a candidate could easily slip them into rhetoric with
little questioning.90 While these traditional coded appeals would feature in much of McCain’s
campaign, the bulk of his coded rhetoric would be in the form of attack ads on Barack Obama,
where Obama became a surrogate for coded appeals about blacks as a group. When examining
2008 it necessary to consider the power of the internet and social media; despite the McCain
campaign’s limited use of social media, the internet allowed for the message to be spread to a
much wider audience than in previous elections.91
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Many of McCain’s attack ads on Obama centered around the message of “he’s just not
ready” or “who is Obama?”; the power of these ads was that they could easily be described as
being about Obama being a relatively young outsider, instead of being coded appeals about how
a black man was out of place in such a position of power. This is seen in the ad “dangerous”
which opens with the question “who is Barack Obama”, before illuminating reasons such as the
War in Iraq and reckless spending for why Obama should not be President.92 While this is a
fairly straight forward attack ad about an opponent’s ability to handle major issues, opening with
the question of “who is Obama”, comes with a code for blacks. Beyond just asking who Obama
is, the ad also begs the question, in a coded way, of who is this black man to try and come into
this power? This questioning of a black person’s place in this sort of power is again seen in the
ad “special”, which closes by saying “the fact is Barack Obama’s just not ready… yet”.93 This ad
again points to Obama’s youth; but similar to “dangerous” provides a code for saying black
people are out of place in positions of major political power. What makes “special” such a deep
and powerful code is that it has definite plausible deniability of being about Obama’s youth and
lack of experience at the national level. While it sends this message, it simultaneously makes the
coded claim that the country is not ready for a black president. The creators of the ad also seem
to recognize that this may be perceived as a coded appeal. Consequently there is the addition of
the word “yet” to cover any accusations of racism and maintain that there may come a day when
Obama and other black people will be capable of running for the highest office. What makes
these ads so effective is that they came at a time when a black person was running for President
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and there was an air that this might spark the beginning of a post-racial era in the United States.
This was an issue grappled with by those on both sides of the political spectrum. Racial
progressives could argue that Obama’s success demonstrated how far the country had come.
While for those on the opposite end of the spectrum there was potential to argue that Obama’s
success meant discussions about the need for racial progress could disappear.94
While some of the messaging about Obama not being ready yet employed new forms of
code others relied on traditional codes and stereotypes to send the same message.95 One of the
reoccurring messages of the campaign was an attempt to portray Obama as a celebrity in an
effort to make him look less credible and out of place in such a position of power. The coded
implication of this lies in the history of blacks being portrayed as out of place in positions of high
power, in this case the presidency. Portraying Obama as a celebrity is seen in the ad “celeb”
where the narrator describes Obama as a major public figure, similarly to Paris Hilton and
Brittany Spears, but again raises the question of his preparedness to handle major obstacles
facing the country.96 The coded appeal lies in the comparison of a celebrity being in the White
House with a black person being in the White House. The ad never once mentions race, but it
carries the underlying claim that there is a similar level of unsuitability about a black person and
a celebrity being in such a powerful position. An ad with a similar message to “celeb” is “the
one”, which incorporates religious sounds and imagery as a way to portray Obama as a sort of
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self-anointed religious leader.97 The ad portrays Obama as a reverend or pseudo-prophet,
someone who may provide a major emotional appeal to people, but not someone who is ready to
lead the country. This echoes the sentiment of Sarah Palin calling Obama a “community
organizer”; both “the one” and Palin’s statement are designed to associate Obama with a local
religious or community leader, someone who can be very emotionally exciting and moving, but
not someone who should be trusted with the Nation’s highest office.98 In both “celeb” and “the
one” there is in implicit message that Obama, as a black man, is out of place chasing such
political power. These appeals demonstrate a very nuanced code; explicitly they are only
claiming that his age and lack of experience inhibit his ability to be President. All the while
employing traditional codes to insinuate that his race would make him unqualified for such a
position.
Beyond making coded appeals that Obama was not ready to lead, several of McCain’s
commercials employed very nuanced coded links between Obama and deep-rooted negative
stereotypes about blacks.99 One theme that reappeared was a connection between Obama and an
increase in spending; the power is that the appeal is about limiting spending, a traditional
conservative principle, while the coded power lies in the old negative association of blacks and
welfare spending.100 The ad “sweat equity” exemplifies this by showing Obama talking about
“spreading the wealth around” and then featuring individuals saying “I’m Joe the plumber” and
questioning why they should have to pay for Obama’s tax hikes.101 Important to notice is that the
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ad never mentions race, or any traditional “dog-whistle” words such as welfare. Part of the ad’s
effectiveness may lay in the ad’s ability to connect traditionally loaded phrases about blacks and
traditional conservative antipathy towards spending believed only to be helping blacks.102 This
message becomes even stronger when taken in collaboration with the ad “compare”, an ad
loaded with “dog-whistle” words.103 “Compare” contrasts pictures of Obama and McCain,
accompanied by short phrases comparing and contrasting the two candidates. One comparison
shows a picture of Obama with the message “spread your income”, while the image of McCain
says “keep what’s yours.”104 This is overtly a comparison of liberal versus conservative spending
policy; nevertheless, the wording “keep what’s yours” sends a very deep code of protecting one’s
income from being used to support the welfare policies generally associated with blacks. These
ads use an exceptional degree of subtlety, with traditional coded appeals being used beneath the
surface. The stigma of using race baiting, coming from negative reaction to ads such as “Willie
Horton,” which, coupled with an era of “political correctness,” have forced racial appeals to
move deeper underground to a point where they must rely extensively on preexisting perceptions
of blacks and welfare policies.105
The 2008 election came at a fascinating moment in U.S. history; the election saw a rise in
the use of the internet as a campaign tool, something that would set the stage for ensuing
elections by providing a platform that reached a much wider audience. 2008 was a seminal
election for racial politics and race as a whole; as a country historically marred by racial tensions
elected its first black president. Obama’s campaign showed just how far the country had come,
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but it also showed that as much as things had changed they also stayed the same. Obama was
repeatedly used as a code for talking about blacks as a group.106 Consequently 2008 saw a
decrease in traditional “law and order” rhetoric, which by 2008 was recognized by most as a
coded appeal, but was supplemented by the use of Obama as a newer and more nuanced code. If
2008 demonstrated how nuanced racial code could be, 2016 showed how overt a code could
become and remain appealing.
The elections of 1968, 1988 and 2008 have told a story, one of an ever shifting and
evolving racial coded landscape. 1968 was the birth of coded language, when “law and order”
became a way of talking about race without ever saying anything explicitly racial. The 1988
“Willie Horton” ad demonstrated the immense power of coded racial appeals, but also
demonstrated the danger that taking these ads too far could have. The 2008 election caused some
to believe America had become “post-racial”, and the code used by the McCain campaign had to
be tremendously nuanced. Upon electing Obama the country had seemingly reached its race
baiting bottom, an era where racially divisive appeals would either disappear, or at least go so far
underground that they would be difficult to identify and become ineffective. On June 16, 2015,
in the span of less than an hour, this coded trajectory would completely change course when
Donald Trump issued his now famous statement about Mexicans saying immigrants from
Mexico were “bringing drugs… bringing crime… they’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good
people.”107 With that statement racial code became much less prevalent, and as one may expect
the following 15 months contained even more explicit racial language. However, the code did
not completely break; undoubtedly June 6, 2015 marked a major change in the history of coded
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language, but did not instigate a complete change in the rhetoric. This brings us back to our
opening question, the question that has driven this plunge into the history and the circumstances
surrounding racial code. The question of why, after so many years of racial progress and pushing
race baiting further underground, was Trump able to so spectacularly change the code and have it
be accepted and embraced by vast swaths of the American people?
In 2016 Trump used both coded and un-coded language about race; this tactic, coupled
with social media’s broad reach, is potentially what made Trump’s race baiting so effective.108
There were instances when he utilized overt racial rhetoric, especially when talking about
Muslims or Latinos. For example on December 2 2015 he tweeted “@thumpmomma: I likewise
saw militant Muslims burning our flag and burning George Bush photos and figures, right after
9/11 Not#here!””, this tweet was emblematic of Trump’s overt race baits against Muslims.109
This tweet was also a major break from traditional coded language; there is little plausible
deniability in such a tweet that this claim is about anything besides an attempt to associate all
Muslims with terrorism. Similar to his overt attacks on Muslims, Trump was very blatant in his
race baiting about Hispanics, particularly Mexicans. On July 13th 2015 Trump tweeted “likewise,
billions of dollars get brought into Mexico through the border. We get the killers, drugs & crime,
they get the money!”110 Again little plausible deniability is offered here, as Trump explicitly
compares Mexican immigrants, and Mexicans in general, to criminals. Both of these tweets, one
aimed against Muslims and the other against Mexicans show Trump’s willingness to use unfiltered language against the two groups who are presently the most prevalent subjects of racial
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animosity.111 While these tweets were representative of the way that Trump frequently spoke
about minorities he still resorted to coded appeals, particularly when discussing blacks. An
excellent example of this came in a November 22, 2015 tweet where Trump tweeted a picture of
a black man holding a gun with a chart showing the percentages of total homicides between
races.112 Among the statistics there are a few that stand out “Blacks Killed by Police~~1%,
Whites Killed by Whites~~ 16%, Whites Killed by Blacks~~81%, Blacks Killed by Blacks~~
97%”; the statistics seem to be designed to play upon old racial stereotypes about the violent
nature of black people.113 What is most noticeable about this post is that the “Crime Statistics
Bureau-San Francisco” is not an actual research group, nor are these statistics true, as a variety of
fact checking groups deemed these claims false.114 The coding here is similar to the type of race
baiting seen in 1968, 1988 and 2008, the tweet employed racial stereotypes to appeal to the
backlash vote. Additionally the statistics are geared to discredit “Black Lives Matter”, similarly
to Nixon’s “The First Civil Right” ad, which sought to downplay the Civil Rights movement by
making the generally accepted statement about all people having the right to live. However, the
tweet also offers plausible deniability that it is only about crime, something that is crucial for a
racially coded appeal. What was so unique about Trump’s discussion of race was that it broke
code when discussing Muslims and Latinos, while continuing the use historic codes and “dogwhistle” appeals when discussing blacks. Considering that the 2016 election happened so
recently it is difficult to determine why this blend of coded and un-coded rhetoric was so
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effective. It is plausible that the combination of coded and un-coded racial language allowed
Trump to appeal to both the base he founded in the primaries, and the more traditional base that
would be accepting of coded appeals, but wary of un-coded ones.
The brief examination of Trump’s racial language shows that viewing 2016 as an outlier
in an era of general “political correctness” and declining overt racial politics, may be incorrect.
Instead it is feasible that 2016 ushered in a brand new era of racial backlash voting. What the
1968, 1988 and 2008 elections demonstrated is that there must be strong backlash sentiment for
race baiting to be effective. The backlash white vote must have a feeling of insecurity, a feeling
that they are being left behind and a minority group is being given an unfair leg up. In 1968 it
was an uncertainty of what lay ahead in a post-Civil Rights America. 1988 came after the
Reagan years of personal responsibility and anti-welfare spending, while economically there was
a growing unease of jobs being shipped out of the country. 2008 came at a time of financial
crises, a lingering war, and a major uncertainty among many racial conservatives about what a
black presidential candidate meant for their future. 2016 saw elements of these three elections
coming together in one election, one where Donald Trump saw these factors and brilliantly
employed them to his advantage. One way to look at 2016 is as a backlash against social
liberalism that has become increasingly prevalent in America since 2008. Prior to 2016 the
country had eight years of a black president, a rise in “political correctness”, a racial movement
in “Black Lives Matter” unseen in scale and influence since the Civil Rights movement of the
1960s. All of this coupled with stifled economic growth for many working class whites delivered
an electorate primed for backlash. When Trump opened his campaign with his comments about
Mexicans, he sent a loud and clear message to “left-behind whites” that he was their candidate, a
candidate who would not be restrained by the growing forces of political correctness, racial
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liberalism and liberal identity politics. Trump’s campaign may have ushered in a new era of
sorts; one that at times followed the trends of previous elections, while also following the tone
set by his first political speech to the country. Trump followed racial coding trended in regard to
certain minority groups, using code where it was politically profitable, while simultaneously
breaking code where he recognized that his language would be politically acceptable to at least a
portion of his base. Do the elections of 1968, 1988 and 2008 explain why Trump was able to run
his campaign in the way he did? No, but some of the major factors of 1968, 1988 and 2008
resurfaced in 2016, therefore understanding the background of these forces aid an understanding
of what made Trump’s racial rhetoric so powerful.
Conclusion: 2016 and Towards a New Normal?
The 2016 campaign between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton proved to be one of the
most divisive and hard fought campaigns in American history. The campaign also saw a return of
racial rhetoric that, based upon the trajectory of recent elections including the three explored in
this paper, appeared to heading underground. What made Trump’s racially divisive rhetoric so
powerful and appealing will undoubtedly be the topic of extensive debate for years to come. The
goal of this paper has been, through the study of three earlier elections crucial to racial code, to
add to the literature surrounding what made Trump so appealing. This work has shown the
necessity of an ever shifting racial code in order to stay relevant to the fears and anxiety of the
current backlash electorate. It has also demonstrated how racial code is at its most effective
during times of great social and racial anxiety, when there is substantial fear of loss by the
backlash electorate. Both of these factors proved crucial for Donald Trump’s victory; Trump
understood the fears of backlash voters throughout the country and spoke directly to the voter’s
fears of impending white loss and encroaching outsiders. What remains to be seen is which
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direction racial politics, and political discussions in general turn. Will they follow the trajectory
of 1968, 1988 and 2008 and move further underground? Or will racial politics follow the path set
by 2016, with the backlash vote becoming increasingly powerful and vocal, where a combination
of overt and coded appeals become central to winning elections? This work does not claim to
provide answers to these questions, but instead to provide a platform for discussion of where
American politics about race are heading, based upon where they have been. Racial politics will
undoubtedly be a part of future American rhetoric, it now remains to be seen if it will be in the
form of racial code, or the combination of implicit and explicit rhetoric that featured in 2016.
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